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Abstract 
In this paper we explore the determinants and the consequences of the development 
of the corporate bond market in Colombia. We use a large firm-level dataset for the period 
1997-2004 and find that the larger, more profitable and more leveraged firms have a higher 
probability to issue bonds. The econometric results also show that the larger the treasury 
bond market, the lower the probability that a firm will issue bonds, suggesting the presence 
of a crowding out effect. On the demand side, the panel estimations indicate that investors 
with  larger  portfolios  tend  to  hold  more  corporate  bonds.  Also,  from  the  viewpoint  of 
investors, average bond issue size is a critical variable. Finally, we find that sectors that 
have more corporate bonds (as percentage of total liabilities) have greater loan quality, and 
this result is stronger during periods of banking crises. We conclude that bond market 





En este trabajo exploramos los determinantes y las consecuencias del desarrollo del 
mercado  de  bonos  corporativos  en  Colombia.  Utilizamos  una  muestra  amplia  con 
información  por  firma  para  el  período  1997-2004  y  encontramos  que  las  firmas  más 
grandes,  rentables  y  apalancadas  tienen  una  mayor  probabilidad  de  emitir  bonos.  Los 
resultados econométricos también muestran que un mayor tamaño del mercado de deuda 
pública tiene un efecto negativo sobre la probabilidad de las firmas de emitir bonos, lo cual 
sugiere un efecto de crowding out. Por el lado de la demanda, las estimaciones de panel 
indican  que  los  inversionistas  con  portafolios  grandes  tienen  mayor  probabilidad  de 
adquirir  bonos.  Así  mismo,  desde  el  punto  de  vista  de  los  inversionistas,  el  tamaño 
promedio de la emisión es una variable crítica. Finalmente, encontramos que los sectores 
económicos en donde la participación de los bonos dentro del total de pasivos es mayor, 
tienen una mejor calidad de la cartera y enfrentan con mayor fortaleza los períodos de 
crisis. Concluimos que el mercado de bonos puede tener un importante papel contra cíclico 
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In  spite  of  recent  progress,  the  Colombian  financial  sector  remains  small  and 
shallow,  and  largely  dominated  by  the  banking  sector.  However,  in  terms  of  the  debt 
market, Colombia appears as a medium size player, both in terms of the domestic public 
debt and the corporate bond market.  
This chapter deals specifically with the determinants and the consequences of the 
development of the corporate bond market. This is an interesting issue, considering the 
recent growth of this segment of the capital markets (in 2004 the real value of outstanding 
corporate bonds was four times higher than in 1997). In spite of its recent growth, there are 
a relatively small number of issues and issuers (there were on average only 39 issuers per 
year between 1997 and 2004). The issuing firms, mostly in manufacturing and services, 
tend to be large and profitable. For example, in asset terms, bond issuers were on average 
42 times larger than non-issuers in 2004. More importantly, issuing firms have grown much 
faster than non-issuers.  
We  use  a  large  firm-level  dataset  for  the  period  1997-2004  and  find  some 
interesting results. First, the larger the firm, the higher the probability that it will issue 
bonds. Second, more profitable and more leveraged firms are more likely to issue bonds. 
Third, cost per peso issued has, as expected, a negative impact on the number of firms that 
issue corporate bonds, suggesting that only the larger firms are able to issue bonds because 
they spread the entry costs over larger size issues.  
We  also  explore  the  interplay  between  the  public  debt  and  the  corporate  bond 
market that is a complex and relevant issue. At least for the case of Colombia, the evidence 
suggests that crowding out effects dominate: the larger the treasury bond market, the lower 
the probability that a firm will decide to look for financing in the market. This conclusion is 
at odds with the alternative view of these two markets as complements.   
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On the demand side, we use detailed information from institutional investors (all 
pension funds, both mandatory and voluntary, and severance pay funds are investors in 
corporate bonds). The main results indicate that investors with larger portfolios have a 
higher probability of holding corporate bonds. Interestingly, a large portfolio share invested 
in public debt tends to decrease the investor’s probability of holding corporate bonds. This 
is an important result because it indicates that the crowding out effects of a large stock of 
treasury bonds negatively affect not only the supply but also de the demand of corporate 
bonds. Also, from the viewpoint of investors, average bond issue size is a critical variable. 
Only large issues are sufficiently liquid to awake the appetite of potential investors.   
The chapter concludes with a discussion on the consequences of the development of 
the corporate bond market. Using a third database, we look at the loan performance in the 
different economic sectors. The sectors that have more corporate bonds (as percentage of 
total liabilities) have greater loan quality. In other words, the share of nonperforming loans 
in these sectors is much lower. More importantly, this result is stronger during periods of 
banking crises. The normative implication is that the development of the bond market plays 
a countercyclical role during periods of financial stress. Thus, policies aimed at improving 
the workings of this market have a potentially large dividend. 
The  chapter  is  structured  in  the  following  way.  After  a  brief  literature  review  we 
present an overview of the Colombian financial sector (which can be omitted by the reader 
familiar with its history and evolution). After providing the reader with this background, we 
characterize the Colombian bond markets and introduce the databases that were constructed 
for this chapter. We then use these data to estimate the models that explain the probability 
that a firm issues bonds (supply) as well as the probability that an institutional investor 
holds them (demand). The next section provides some empirical evidence to support the  
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idea that having a larger bond market is desirable. The chapter ends with a brief section of 
conclusions and policy recommendations.  
 
Literature Review 
The  relatively  scarce  literature  addressing  the  issue  of  bond  market  development  has 
focused on the factors that explain the market’s development in a multi-country regression 
setting. For example, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) study the causes for the 
slow  development  of  the  Asian  bond  market,  using  a  cross-section  of  developing  and 
developed economies. They find that larger country size, stronger institutions, less volatile 
exchange rates, and more competitive banking sectors are positively associated with bond 
market capitalization. Asian countries' strong fiscal balances have not resulted in growth of 
the  government  bond  markets.  Their  results  suggest  that  the  region's  structural 
characteristics and macroeconomic and financial policies account fully for differences in 
bond market development between Asia and the rest of the world. 
Zervos (2004) documents the costs of debt and equity issuance, both in the domestic 
and the international markets, for firms in Brazil, Chile and Mexico, collecting data on 
investment  banking  and  legal  fees,  regulatory  and  exchange  listing  costs,  taxes,  rating 
agency  fees,  and  expenditures  for  marketing  and  publishing.  The  paper  suggests  that 
Brazilian firms face similar costs in the local markets and abroad in issuing debt, but face 
significantly higher costs in the local markets when issuing equity. Chilean firms can issue 
debt  more  cheaply  in  the  international markets,  and  while  issuing  equity  in  their  local 
market is cheaper, transaction costs have resulted in a preference for bonds over equity as a 
source of financing. Finally, Mexican firms face the lowest costs when issuing debt, but the  
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highest to issue equity. In addition, the paper underscores the role played by the investors’ 
base in influencing the ability of firms to access the domestic capital markets. 
Beck  and  Levine  (2002)  study  whether  market-based  or  bank-based  financial 
systems are better at financing the expansion of industries that depend heavily on external 
finance, at facilitating the birth of new establishments, and at improving the efficiency of 
capital allocation across industries. They do not find evidence for either the market-based 
or the bank-based hypothesis. While the efficiency of the legal system and the overall 
degree of financial development boost industry growth, having a bank-based or market-
based system does not per se seem to matter for the formation of new establishments, or for 
an efficient capital allocation. Levine (2002) also explores the relative merits of bank-based 
and  market-based  financial  systems.  Using  a  broad  cross-country  database,  his  results 
indicate  that  although  overall  financial  development  is  robustly  linked  with  economic 
growth, there is no support for either the bank-based or the market-based view. 
Faulkender and Petersen (2003) examine if, rather than being constrained in their 
access to incremental capital by the risk of their cash flows and by their characteristics, 
firms may be rationed by lenders. They find that firms with access to public bond markets 
have  significantly  different  leverage  ratios.  Even  after  controlling  for  the  firm 
characteristics previously found to determine observed capital structure and the possible 
endogeneity of having a bond rating, they find that firms which are able to raise debt from 
public markets have 40 percent more debt. 
More recently, Burger and Warnock (2006a) analyze the development of 49 local 
bond markets. They show that countries with stable inflation rates and strong creditor rights 
have more developed local bond markets and rely less on foreign-currency-denominated 
bonds. Their results suggest that emerging economies are not inherently dependent upon  
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foreign-currency  debt  and  that  by  improving  policy  performance  and  strengthening 
institutions they may develop local currency bond markets, lower their currency mismatch, 
and decrease the likelihood of future crises. In a follow up paper Burger and Warnock 
(2006b) analyze foreign participation in the bond markets of over 40 countries. They find 
bond markets in less developed countries have returns characterized by high variance and 
negative skewness, and that these factors largely explain the lack of participation of U.S. 
investors. While results based on a three-moment CAPM indicate that what U.S. investors 
avoid  is  diversifiable  idiosyncratic  risk,  their  analysis  suggests  that  by  reducing 
macroeconomic instability countries can improve foreign participation. 
For  the  case  of  Colombia,  the  literature  has  focused  on  the  capital  markets  in 
general,  but  not  specifically  on  the  bond  market.  Fedesarrollo  (1996)  led  an  umbrella 
project to examine the obstacles to the development of the capital markets from different 
angles, including a revision of the institutional and regulatory restrictions, of the potential 
suppliers and market participants, and of the structural macroeconomic variables that affect 
it. The result of this study, known as the Mission of the Capital Markets, is a set of policy 
recommendations that led the way for the development of a government bond market and 
proposed several regulatory and institutional reforms regarding the supply and demand of 
corporate debt. 
More recently, Anif and Fedesarrollo (2004) studied the determinants of the firms’ 
capital structure, in an effort to understand their reluctance to issue debt and equity. Using 
the input from interviews, workshops, and a survey, this study found that only large firms 
participate, and that the market is still very concentrated in short term debt. The diagnosis 
from  the  point  of  view  of  both  firms  and  institutional  investors  was  not  far  from  that 




Overview of the Financial Sector 
In spite of having experienced significant growth over the last 15 years, the Colombian 
financial sector is still small and shallow. Both the Colombian banking and non-banking 
financial sectors are relatively small compared to those of the developed countries and to 
the Asian emerging economies, in particular with regards to the banking sector and the 
stock market (see Table 4.1). When compared to Latin America, the banking sectors in 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru are of similar size, but much smaller than in Brazil and Chile. 
The  picture  is  slightly  different for  the  debt  markets,  in  which  Colombia  appears  as  a 
medium size player, both in terms of the domestic public debt and the corporate bond 
market. In 2004, only Chile and Argentina had larger corporate bond markets (relative to 
GDP). 
The Colombian bank-based financial system is much larger than the market-based 
segment. Thus, the banking sector remains the main source of funding of all productive 
activities.  The  stock  market,  active  since  the  1960s,  and  the  more  recent  private  bond 
market,  are  both  still  concentrated  on  a  small  number  of  issuers  and  issues,  and  are 
relatively illiquid
1. The performance of the public debt market has been, by contrast, very 
dynamic since the early 1990s.  
In the remainder of this section we describe the main developments of both the 
banking and non-banking sectors since the 1990s.  
 
The Banking Sector 
Prior to the 1990s, the Colombian banking sector operated under a model of specialized 
institutions. Commercial banks had a monopoly on checking accounts and held about 60%  
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of  the  sector’s  total  assets.  The  remaining  40%  was  held  between  three  types  of 
intermediaries:  investment  banks,  mortgage  banks,  and  consumer  loan  companies. 
Investment banks appeared in the late 1950s with the purpose of facilitating long term 
financing  to  the  real  sector  through  the  issue  of  stocks  and  bonds.  Their  role,  largely 
unfulfilled to this date, was to aid the development of the capital markets. Mortgage banks 
were the result of a reform of the system of housing finance in the early 1970s, which gave 
these  intermediaries  a  monopoly  over  the  use  of  the  UPAC--an  indexation  mechanism 
applying both to saving deposits and mortgages. 
Financial repression was pervasive between the mid 1960s and the 1980s. In the 
context of import substitution industrialization, credit was directed toward certain sectors 
while interest rates were heavily controlled and regulated. In addition, reserve deposits–
monetary policy’s main instrument at the time–and forced investments represented between 
35% and 40% of total deposits. Foreign ownership of banks was heavily restricted, foreign 
exchange controls prevented the development of a foreign exchange market, and direct 
Central Bank lending to the government made the development of a public debt market 
unnecessary. All of the above contributed to the slow development of the financial sector at 
the time. 
In addition, during the early 1980s, as a result of the Latin American debt crisis, the 
Colombian  financial  sector  was  under  severe  stress.  The  lack  of  adequate  prudential 
regulation  and  supervision  led  to  the  intervention  and  nationalization  of  several 
intermediaries. The estimated net cost of these interventions was 3% of GDP
2.  
As a result of the crisis, financial regulation and supervision were strengthened in 
line  with  the  Basel  standards
3,  and  a  deposit  insurance  scheme  was  created.  
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Simultaneously,  the  predominant  instrument  of  monetary  policy  shifted  from  reserve 
deposits to open market operations (purchases and sales of Central Bank securities). 
An intense process of financial reform took place in the early 1990s. Laws 45 of 
1990, 9 of 1991, and 35 of 1993 substantially changed the structure and operation of the 
financial sector. Reserve deposits were lowered, most forced investments were eliminated, 
and subsidized direct Central Bank lending to the government was made unconstitutional. 
Although interest rate controls had been lifted before, reforms restricted their use even 
more by limiting their potential application to 90 days only. In addition, restrictions on the 
foreign ownership of banks were dismantled, while intermediaries were authorized to a 
wider range of activities. At the same time, exchange rate controls were removed, allowing 
intermediaries to participate in a growing foreign exchange market.  
As  a  result  of  the  reforms,  as  well  as  of  large  capital  inflows,  financial 
intermediation grew rapidly. M3/GDP rose to 43.2% of GDP in 1997, up from 28% in 
1990.  The  number  of  financial  intermediaries  increased,  several  public  banks  were 
privatized, and foreign ownership in the banking sector went from 10.2% in 1992 to 29% in 
1998.  
Given  the  unsustainable  rates  of  growth  in  public  and  private  expenditures,  the 
current account deficit reached 5.4% of GDP in 1997 and the central government deficit 
increased up to 5% of GDP in 1998, making the economy vulnerable to the effects of the 
Asian and Russian crises. In response to the attacks on the currency resulting from the 
sudden stop in capital inflows, the central bank raised interest rates at the beginning of 
1998. The economic consequences of the reversal in capital flows, the increase in interest 
rates, the reduction in expenditures, as well as the balance sheet effects of the depreciation 
of the currency, resulted in a severe contraction of the economy in 1999 (-4.2% of GDP).   
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The  repercussions  on  the  financial  sector  were  far  reaching.  The  share  of  non-
performing loans over total loans rose to 16% in 1999, up from 6% in 1997. Progress in 
terms of size and depth of the financial intermediation suffered a major reversal. The stock 
of loans, which had risen from 28% to 40% of GDP between 1990 and 1997, fell to 25% in 
2001. While commercial credit and consumer loans started recovering in 2002, the stock of 
mortgage loans fell to 4% of GDP in 2005, down from over 13% before the crisis (1997).  
As a result of the crisis, financial regulation and supervision was elevated to new 
levels,  where  risk  is  more  adequately  evaluated  and  provisions  are  stricter,  and  this  is 
apparently proving fruitful. Also, the financial crisis triggered a reform to the bankruptcy 
law (law 550 of 1999) given the large number of firms that were under severe stress. The 
existing legislation (law 222 of 1995) was considered inadequate. Its application would 
have resulted in the liquidation of a large percentage of firms during the crisis.  
The new law was conceived as a transitory mechanism, initially for five years but 
later extended until the end of 2006. The law provided incentives for creditors and debtors 
to negotiate “restructuring agreements”. However, 28% of the firms under restructuring 
ended in liquidation, suggesting that in a large number of the cases the law delayed the 
execution of creditor rights.  
Under the law, voting rights allowed for coalitions between shareholders and small 
creditors (euphemistically called internal creditors), in most cases detrimental for creditors 
in the financial sector. Also, tax authorities had privileges over other creditors. The law, 
although partially useful under a period of severe financial strain, had an anti-creditor bias.  
Given these problems, a new bankruptcy law was approved at the end of 2006 (law 
1116 of 2006). The new law follows international standards, providing better protection to 




The Non-banking Sector 
Some important developments have taken place in this market since the early 1990s. In 
particular,  the  liberalization  of  foreign  portfolio  investment,  the  appearance  of  new 
institutional investors, the development of mortgage securitization and the progress made 
toward an improved market infrastructure (credit ratings, the unification of stock exchange 
markets,  and  the  modernization  of  transactional  systems,  among  others)  imply  more 
progress in recent years than in the preceding decades.  
In Colombia, the firms’ preference for bank loans over market-based instruments is, 
to  a  large  extent,  the result  of  policy  choices.  In  1951,  for  instance,  the  Central  Bank 
became a development bank by providing subsidized loans to specific sectors, creating a 
bias against bonds or equity financing. Tax measures were also a determining factor in this 
direction. Perhaps the most important was the 1953 reform that introduced a system that 
taxed simultaneously corporate profits and shareholders’ dividends. This measure, which 
proved  detrimental  for  the  development  of  the  stock  market,  was  eliminated  in  1986. 
During the inflation acceleration of the 1970s, the stock market growth was also negatively 
affected by the tax deducibility of the inflationary component of interest payments. 
Later measures were headed in the direction of correcting these and other policies to 
facilitate  the  development  of  the  capital  markets.  Decree  1321  of  1989,  for  example, 
eliminated taxes on capital gains in the stock market. Law 49 of 1990 established that 
profits from the transfer of shares through the stock market would not constitute income or 
capital gains, and that investment funds and mutual funds that administrated trusts would be 
exempt from income taxes.  
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Only in the 1990s would significant progress be observed in the non-banking sector. 
Law 9 of 1991 allowed inflows of portfolio foreign investment, which in 1997 reached 
USD$1.5 billion dollars. After drastically falling as a result of Asian and Russian crises, 
these flows have recovered in recent years. However, these funds continue to be low (0.4% 
of GDP). 
Labour and pension reforms (Law 50 of 1990 and Law 100 of 1993, respectively) 
created new institutional investors that have played a key role in the development of the 
capital  markets.  The  first  of  these  reforms  obliged  employers  to  make  a  contribution 
equivalent  of  one  month’s  salary  per  year.  These  contributions  are  deposited  in  the 
employees’  individual  accounts  administered  by  Severance  Pay  Funds  (employees  are 
allowed to withdraw money in case of unemployment or, under certain circumstances, for 
education and housing). The assets of these funds represented about 1.3% of GDP in 2005. 
    The pension reform created the private Mandatory Pension Funds to administer the 
defined-contribution pension regime
4. As in the case of the severance pay funds, pension 
contributions deposited in the individual accounts are invested in the capital markets. Since 
their creation, the pension funds have grown to become the most important player in the 
market. Their portfolio went from 0.04% of GDP in 1994 to almost 12% of GDP in 2005. 
Law 100 also created the Voluntary Pension Funds that are not as large (0.2% of GDP in 
2005), but have grown dynamically in the recent years thanks to a tax benefit that applies to 
the contribution of high salary individuals. The pension reform also created new business 
opportunities for the life insurance companies (pension fund insurance and life annuities), 
providing them with additional resources to invest in the capital markets.  
Other elements have also been key for the capital markets’ recent development: (1) the 
creation of custody service entities in the early 1990s, to reduce operating risks and add  
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safety  to  financial  transactions;  (2)  the  development  of  mortgage  securitization  as  an 
alternative long-term investment opportunity, introduced by Law 35 of 1993 and pushed 
further by Law 546 of 1999, to provide mortgage banks with longer term financing. By the 
end of 2005, mortgage securitizations amounted to 1.5% of GDP; (3) the merger of three 
local stock exchanges (Bogotá, Medellín and Occidente) into one national stock exchange 
in 2001, to avoid the inefficiencies resulting from the market segmentation; and (4) the 
development in the 1990s of a unified electronic transaction systems, providing real time 
information on the bonds and stocks traded, and speeding transactions
5. 
In 2005, the supervision of banks and securities was merged into one agency with the 
goal of eliminating the “regulatory arbitrage” between the two segments of the market. 
Also in 2005, legal changes improved corporate governance, requiring independent board 
members in entities that issue securities, with the purpose of protecting small investors. 




Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the Colombian private and public bond market. In 2004, 
the total outstanding debt in the Colombian bond market was close to US$33 billion. About 
70% was public debt, while the remaining 30% was equally split between corporate bonds 
and bonds issued by financial institutions.  
The market size doubled between 1997 and 2004. The public debt component more 
than tripled over the same period, while the corporate debt market, although much smaller, 
also  increased  significantly.  Debt  issued  by  the  financial  sector  appears  to  have  lost 
participation in the market. In fact, the share of Treasury bonds rose to 23% of GDP in  
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2004, up from 8% in 1997. During the same period, debt issued by the financial sector fell 
from a similar starting point (7.8%) to about half (4.3%) as percent of GDP. Corporate 
bonds, on the contrary, rose to 3.9% of GDP in 2004, from close to 1% in 1997. This is a 
significant increase that we discuss in greater detail below. 
   These  numbers  suggest  that,  while  the  overall  debt  market  evolution  has  been 
driven by a large and increasing public debt component, its performance has not hindered 
that of corporate debt in an evident way. On the contrary, the growth dynamics of the 
public  debt  market  in  Colombia  may  have  facilitated  the  incipient  development  of  the 
corporate bond market that remains small by international standards, but shows significant 
growth in size in recent years. The low growth of bank loans over the period 1997-2004 
could explain the loss in the share of debt issued by financial institutions. 
 
The Public Bond Market 
The  Constitution  of  1991  set  the  way  for  a  new  model  of  government  financing  by 
restricting the use of primary financing (which requires the unanimous approval of the 
independent central bank’s board of directors). Treasury bonds (TES) rose to 35.7% of the 
total public debt in 2004, from 12.6% in 1995 (see Figure 4.2). This rapid increase reflects 
the critical role played by bonds in financing the central governments’ deficit.  
Not all treasury bonds are allocated through market mechanisms. A-type treasury 
bonds are issued with the exclusive purpose of covering the Government’s liability with the 
Central Bank and do not reach the market. These are a minority of the total treasury bonds 
outstanding. B-type TES treasury bonds are used to raise funds in the market through three 
alternative mechanisms: (1) auctions, (2) agreed operations with decentralized public sector 
entities (at market interest rates), and (3) mandatory TES investments, to capture the excess  
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liquidity of publicly owned companies or public entities. As a share of the total public debt, 
B-type TES grew from 3.4% in 1994 to 35.6% ten years later, mostly allocated through 
auctions and agreed operations. 
The Government’s foreign debt composition also shows an increasing reliance on 
market-based instruments. Foreign debt bonds increased from 7.3% in 1995 to 22.3% in 
2004 as a share of the total debt, reflecting the lower dependence on loans from agencies, 
governments,  multilateral  organizations  and  commercial  banks  (see  Figure  4.2).  The 
resulting re-composition of external financing lowers the degree of conditionality on certain 
policy reforms, common in multilateral lending.  
Without doubt, the dynamism of the public debt market, domestic and external, has 
reflected the emergence of large fiscal imbalances.  Public debt increased from 15% of 
GDP in 1999 to near 50% of GDP in the recent years. Also, the internal public debt market 
has allowed the government to substitute domestic debt for foreign debt: while in the early 
1990s more than 80% of the public debt was external, since 1996 this share has fluctuated 
around 50%, subject to the conditions of both the internal and external markets.  
The growth of the internal public debt market is also explained by demand factors. 
The growing supply of treasury bonds has found sufficient demand in the market, mostly 
from new institutional investors. In addition, the credit stagnation during the financial crisis 
of  1998-2000  contributed  toward  boosting  this  demand.  Credit  risk  considerations  led 
financial intermediaries to substitute loans for investments in treasury bonds during that 
period. In recent years, particularly since mid-2002, demand for treasuries has continued to 
thrive in response to an expansive monetary policy in a  context of reduced alternative 
investments. The financing needs of the Government, in addition, have resulted in attractive 
returns to the investment in treasury bonds, relative to returns on alternative investments.  
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The public debt market has not only grown in size, but also has progressed both 
toward alternative denominations and toward longer average maturities. In addition to the 
peso  denomination  (68.4%  of  the  total  outstanding  in  2004),  B-type  TES  are  also 
denominated in indexed units (36.4% of the total outstanding in 2004), and in U.S. dollars 
(6.7% of the total outstanding in 2004). With respect to maturities, the share of B-type TES 
with maturities of less than five years has dropped significantly (bonds with maturities less 
than one year are now nonexistent) while the share of B-type TES with maturities between 
6 to 10 years has grown from nil to 52.7% over the same time period. These numbers 
evidence a significant success in replacing short-term debt by longer-term debt, which has 
been a goal of the government. Undoubtedly, the development of a more complete yield 
curve has contributed to the deepening of the debt market. The behavior of the share of B-
type TES of maturities longer than ten years is, however, more random, and reflects the 
difficulties faced by the government in issuing long-term bonds in the local market.  
On  the  demand  side,  financial  institutions  have  been  the  largest  buyers  of 
government securities (their share in the outstanding central government bonds increased 
from  35.5%  in  1995  to  near  53%  in  2004).  Other  private  sector  investors  have  also 
increased their holdings of government debt (from 11% in 1995 to near 19% in 2004). 
Other public sector entities now hold less debt issued by the central government (29.6% of 
the total, from a starting point of 53.5%). 
 
The Corporate Bond Market 
Only a small share of Colombian firms finances their activity through the bond market
6. 
Between 1997 and 2004 there were on average only 39 issuers per year, defined as the 
firms reporting bonds outstanding in their balance sheets (in contrast, on average there were  
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7243 non-issuer firms per year). Using the same definition, the median number of issuers 
and  non-issuers  were  46  and  7092,  respectively
7.  Bond  issues  have  tended  to  be 
concentrated in the manufacturing and services sectors (14 and 16 issuer firms on average 
per year in each of these sectors respectively). Issuing firms in other sectors are very scarce.  
There are some marked differences between the firms that have access to the bond 
market and the firms that do not, which are apparent when considering their accounting 
statements for 2004. The first and most obvious difference is size. Bond issuers in 2004 
were  on  average  42  times  larger  than  non-issuers,  as  measured  by  their  assets.  When 
measured by the median, the difference in size appears even larger, by about 91 times. 
There  is  also  less  dispersion  in  size  among  issuers.  These  differences  are  statistically 
significant.  
Also significant are the differences between issuers and non-issuers with respect to 
the composition of their liabilities. The share of debt with the banking sector is on average 
12.7% for the former as opposed to 23.7% for the latter. The median issuer firm reports no 
debt  at  all  with  the  banking  sector,  while  for  the  median  non-issuer  firm  bank  loans 
represent 15% of total debt. However, not all bond issuers have completely substituted 
bank debt. Interestingly, accounts payable are also on average a much lower share of total 
liabilities in the case of issuers (13.1% against 27.8% for non-issuers), and the difference 
among median firms is also substantial (9.1% against 17.4% for non-issuers). In 2004, 
outstanding bonds represented 25% of the total liabilities in issuing firms (22.9% in the 
case of the median issuer firm). This share was only 12.1% in 1997.  
Finally, issuer and non-issuer firms also differ in terms of their profitability. Issuers 
are not only more profitable–on average their operating profit as a share of assets is of 5.4% 
as  opposed  to  3.7%  of  the  non-issuers–but  also  they  show  much  less  dispersion  in  
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profitability  (compare  a  standard  deviation  of  1.25  to  one  of  17).  This  difference  is 
statistically significant. There is no evidence of significant differences between issuers and 
non-issuers with respect to their leverage. 
The more careful revision of the issuers and issue characteristics between 1997 and 
2004 shows at least two interesting facts (see Table 4.2). First, issuer firms, defined this 
time as those that are reported by Superintendencia Financiera as having issued bonds each 
year, are much larger (in asset terms) in 2004 than they were 7 years before. The larger 
issuer firm is 9.6 times larger, the median firm is 13.2 larger, and the smaller issuer firm is 
11.7 times larger in 2004 than it was in 1997. Second, total amounts issued each year have 
considerably increased over time (the market size in 2004 was four times larger than in 
1997). Considering that the total number of issues per year has not increased over time, the 
average issue size has shown a remarkable increase (compare the average issue size of 
$202.3 million in 2004 to that of $16.1 million in 1997, or the evolution of the median and 
the minimum issue sizes over the same period). 
Thus, the size of the Colombian corporate bond market is explained by a small 
number of large issues placed by very large firms. The evidence points toward a pattern of 
bond market development that is increasingly supported on fewer larger issues: a market 
growing in size but apparently not getting deeper.  
In other words, regardless of the reduced number of firms participating in the bond 
market, the fact that those who participate have a large scale has implied that the overall 
share  of  market-based  financing  has  increased  over  time,  substituting  bank  credit  as  a 
source of funding (see Figure 4.3).  
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To complete the picture of the corporate bond market, we take a look at the role 
corporate bonds play in the portfolios of the institutional investors. Table 4.3 summarizes 
the findings for 2004. 
Mandatory  pension  funds  are  the  larger  institutional  investors  in  Colombia  as 
measured by their portfolio size, which amounted to about 50% of the total investment 
portfolio in 2004. They are followed, at a distance, by banks and investment banks. 
Out of a total of 153 potential institutional investors in 2004, 56 do not report any 
participation in the corporate bond market in their financial statements. Non-participants 
are a majority of the consumer loan companies, investment banks, trust companies, and 
banks, and to a lesser extent insurance companies. All pension funds, both mandatory and 
voluntary, and severance pay funds are investors in corporate bonds. On average, however, 
the share of their portfolios invested in corporate bonds is near 11%, way below the ceiling 
of 30% that the regulation permits, for both mandatory pension funds and severance pay 
funds. Notwithstanding, in 2004, mandatory pension funds held 76% of the outstanding 
corporate debt. Severance pay funds and voluntary pension funds followed at a distance, 
with 9% and 7%, respectively. 
The contrast is striking when we look at the shares of the various portfolios invested 
in treasury bonds (31.7% for the median institutional investor). Both mandatory pension 
funds and life insurance companies invest in treasury bonds at levels close to the ceilings of 
50% and 60% dictated for them by the regulation, and the share of the median severance 
pay fund and the median bank portfolios invested in public debt in 2004 is of 70% and 
65%, respectively.  
The public component of the Colombian bond market is evidently getting a large share 
of the market liquidity. However, it is unclear whether there is indeed a liquidity restriction  
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affecting the development of the corporate bond market or whether there are other types of 
restrictions that are more binding. Before we explore this issue further in the following 
section, it is important to mention the results of an investors’ survey that we conducted for 
the purposes of this project
8. According to answers provided by investors, low appetite for 
this type of securities is the result of the absence of a complete reference index (which 
restricts  adequate  pricing)  and  the  lack  of  a  yield  curve  (apart  from  the  low  size  and 
liquidity of the market which are almost always present in the responses). Institutional 
aspects  get  some  attention:  53%  of  the  surveyed  investors  mentioned  the  excessive 
regulation as an obstacle, while 45.2% mentioned the weakness of creditor rights. A very 
large  share  of  the  institutional  investors  considered  that  prudential  regulation  imposes 
unnecessary restrictions on the allocation of portfolios 
The fact that the bond market, with respect to both its public and private components, 
is in the hands of a few large players subject to substantial regulation is an issue to revisit in 
gauging the long-term health of the market. 
 
The Market Participation Choice 
This section explores the decisions of the firms to issue bonds and of the investors to 
acquire them. We use econometric techniques with the available firm-level data. Results of 
these exercises are summarized in Table 4.4. 
 
The Firm’s Decision to Issue Bonds 
We were able to construct a firm-level dataset for the period 1997-2004, containing firm 
characteristics and information about the firm’s activity in the corporate bond market that  
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allows us to estimate a model to explain the probability of a firm to issue bonds. Both firm 
characteristics and market characteristics were considered as explanatory variables.    
Firm characteristics include size (measured by the log of the firm’s assets), leverage 
(total liabilities/total assets), and profitability (measured by the ratio of operating utility to 
total assets). The coefficient on the size variable is expected to have a positive sign since 
the evidence in Colombia points toward a large size as a key determinant of the firm’s 
decision to search for financing through the bond market. The signs on the other two firm-
level variables are, however, uncertain because there is no clear-cut difference between the 
leverage of issuers and non-issuers. With respect to profitability we know that it tends to be 
slightly higher at the mean and median for issuers relative to non-issuers, but this evidence 
may not be enough to guarantee a positive sign. 
The  firm’s  participation  in  the  market  as  bond  issuer  in  the  previous  period  is 
controlled by the inclusion of a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm issued bonds at time 
t-1. The firms’ activity in the capital markets is also controlled with a dummy variable = 1 
if at any previous time, before time t, the firm issued stocks. Both variables are expected to 
have a positive coefficient, since they capture the fact that previous activity in the market 
usually facilitates the decision to participate in it.  
The explicit inclusion of variables identifying whether the firm was listed at the 
local  or  foreign  stock  exchanges,  or  whether  it  was  under  the  supervision  of 
Superintendencia Financiera at the time of issue, is not possible due to the lack of variation 
of the dependent variable within these categories. This is also true about the inclusion of 
fixed effects by sector of activity. Because participation in the bond market occurs only in a 
few sectors, the inclusion of 3-digit ISIC sector dummy variables results in lack of variation 
of the dependent variable within groups, rendering estimation impossible
9.   
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Market  characteristics  included  as  explanatory  variables  are  meant  to  capture 
particularities of the Colombian markets that are common to all firms and should affect 
their choices with regard to financing. We have chosen to focus on the role played by 
financial markets’ characteristics
10.  
The  first  of  these  variables  considered  is  a  proxy  of  the  cost  per  peso  issued, 
constructed  as  the  annual  average  cost  per  peso  across  all  issues  recorded  by 
Superintendecia de Valores. Costs considered in this calculation include (1) the cost of 
registration at the Bonds and Stocks Registry (Registro de Valores) required for each issue, 
and (2) the cost to obtain the issue authorization from Superintendencia Financiera. Both of 
these costs are calculated as a percentage over the amount issued, with rates that vary with 
the issue size
11. The expected coefficient on this variable is negative, since a large cost to 
enter the market should deteriorate the probability of choosing to participate in it.  
Measures of the size of the stock market (value of domestic equities over GDP, also 
known  as  stock  market  capitalization),  the  depth  of  financial  intermediaries  (M3  over 
GDP), and the public debt market (treasury bonds outstanding over GDP) are included in 
the regression in order to capture the degrees of complementarity or substitutability across 
markets. Stocks should be a close substitute to corporate bonds, so the expected coefficient 
on  the  first  of  these  variables  is  negative.  With  regard  to  the  depth  of  financial 
intermediation, the expected coefficient has a positive sign. Finally, the sign on the public 
debt market size measure is uncertain. A negative sign will indicate a crowding-out effect, 
while a positive sign will signal that the development of the public debt market has aided 
the activity of the private side of the bond market. 
The last explanatory variable considered is the size of the capital market relative to 
the financial intermediaries market. The proxy used as a measure in this case is the ratio of  
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the value of domestic equities over M3. A larger capital market, in relative terms, should 
facilitate the development of the corporate bond market, so the coefficient expected on this 
variable is positive. Note that this relative size measure may increase due to growth of the 
capital market either in volume or in prices. The expected impact on the decision to issue 
bonds is positive regardless of which of these prevail. 
Estimation shows that all proposed explanatory variables are significant at the 5% 
level
12. Although the resulting marginal effects of these variables are small, the estimation 
serves well the purpose of explaining the firm’s choice to issue bonds
13 (see Table 4.4).  
The model estimated underscores the importance of scale economies in a firm’s 
decision to use market based financial instruments. Not only is it the large firms that show 
participation in the market over the years, but also the positive sign on the one-period lag of 
the firm size proxy indicates that the larger the firm, the higher the probability that it will 
issue bonds to finance its activity. There must be a threshold firm size below which the cost 
of obtaining financing through the corporate bond market is higher than that of obtaining 
banking credit.  
The leverage and profitability variables both obtain positive coefficients too. The 
positive sign on the former indicates that more leveraged firms have a higher probability to 
finance through bond issues. This suggests that the probability of financing through bonds 
is higher for firms that already have a history of active participation in the financial sector. 
The positive sign on the profitability proxy indicates that after controlling for size, the more 
profitable firms are more likely to search for financing through the bond market.  
The coefficients on the dummy variables controlling for state dependence--previous 
activity in the capital markets--are both positive as expected. While potential biases from  
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the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the right hand side of the regression are 
not explicitly controlled for, the results obtained are robust to the exclusion of this variable. 
The coefficient on the corporate debt market entry cost variable is negative. This 
result is evidence that the cost per peso issued  is a deterrent for firms to finance their 
activities through the market. In combination with the coefficient obtained on firm size, it 
may be pointing toward the fact that larger firms are able to issue bonds because they 
spread the entry costs over larger size issues; recall that the entry costs are calculated over 
the issue value, from percentage rates that vary with the issue size. 
The financial markets’ size variables also yield interesting results. For both the stock 
and financial intermediaries markets the estimated coefficients have the expected signs. The 
coefficient on the stock market size is negative, signalling that indeed stocks and bonds 
behave as substitutes. Growth of the equity market does not per se motivate bond issuance, 
and on its own may be detrimental for the development of the corporate bond market. And 
the positive coefficient on the financial intermediaries size proxy confirms that the larger 
the financial intermediaries sector (the more liquid the market) the larger the probability 
that a firm will choose to issue bonds. Perhaps the most interesting of these results is the 
negative sign of the coefficient obtained on the public debt market size measure, which 
provides evidence that there may be a crowding out effect: the larger the treasury bond 
market, the lower the probability that a firm will decide to look for financing in the market. 
This may be due to the difficulty in competing with the treasury bonds in terms both of risk 
and return, the latter having been high relative to other investment opportunities.  
Finally,  the  size  of  capital  markets  relative  to  financial  intermediaries  shows  a 
positive coefficient. This result is in line with the idea that firms will be more likely to 
participate in a more developed capital market. It also says that the market relative size  
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matters. It is not only a large capital market that is desirable from the corporate bond 
market  development  perspective,  but  also  a  capital  market  that  is  large  relative  to  the 
financial intermediaries sector. 
 
The Institutional Investor’s Decision To Buy Corporate Bonds 
We use the firm level data available for the period 1995-2004, containing the accounting 
statements  of  each  of  the  institutional  investors  and  detailed  information  about  the 
composition of their investment portfolios, to estimate a model to explain the investor’s 
decision to hold corporate bonds. 
Investor characteristics used as explanatory variables include a measure of firm size 
(the log of the investor’s investment portfolio); the share of the investors’ portfolio invested 
in  public  debt  (the  ratio  of  treasury  bonds  holdings  to  total  portfolio  investments);  the 
average issue size at time t, a dummy variable which controls for investor type and a time 
dummy  that  controls  for  macroeconomic  effects
14.  Firm-level  variables  enter  the 
regressions lagged in order to control for potential endogeneity problems.  
The probability of holding corporate bonds is expected to increase with portfolio 
size, as larger investment portfolios ought to be more diversified, so the coefficient on the 
size variable should be positive. With respect to the share of the portfolio invested in public 
debt, while the extent to which the firm is invested in treasury bonds can influence the 
investor’s decision to hold corporate bonds, it is impossible to know ex ante what sign to 
expect on this variable’s coefficient. It may be that investors holding more public debt in 
their  portfolios  tend  to  acquire  fewer  corporate  bonds,  in  which  case  there  would  be 
evidence  of  a  crowding-out  effect  (a  negative  effect).  Alternatively,  it  may  be  that 
portfolios more strongly invested in public debt, with investments in treasury bonds at the  
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ceiling imposed by the regulation, tend to be also more invested in corporate bonds (a 
positive effect).  
The dummy variables by investor type are intended to control for characteristics 
specific to each investor type. In particular, there are regulatory restrictions that may affect 
the possibility of investing in corporate bonds. These regulations have limited variance over 
time and differ only across investor types, so the inclusion of investor-type dummies should 
capture their impact.  
The average issue size at time t (value of total bonds issued over number of issues) 
is included in the regression to capture the role of the corporate bond supply in inducing 
investors to buy corporate bonds. Since investors are concerned about the liquidity of their 
investments,  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  their  decision  to  buy  corporate  bonds  will 
depend to some extent on the size of the bond supply available. On the one hand, if they 
buy a small issue of corporate bonds, their market movements may alter prices and expose 
them to the risk of not achieving the mandatory minimum profitability required by the law. 
On the other, the larger the issue, the larger the number of buyers, thus more participants 
may be interested in buying bonds when the investor needs to sell its bond holdings. The 
bond supply average size is measured as the log of the total amount issued divided by 
number of issues at time t. This market-level variable is constructed using the firm-level 
bond issue data from Superintendencia Financiera introduced above. 
The coefficient on the investor size variable is positive and significant at the 1% 
level,  indicating  that  the  investors  with  larger  portfolios  have  a  higher  probability  of 
holding corporate bonds. This result may also indicate that larger portfolios tend to be more 
diversified. The coefficient on the portfolio share invested on public debt is negative and 
significant at the 5% level. Apparently a large portfolio share invested in public debt tends  
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to decrease the investor’s probability of holding corporate bonds. This result, in line with 
that obtained while exploring the firms’ choice to issue corporate bonds, signals once again 
that the market for public debt may be hindering the development of the corporate bond 
market in Colombia. 
  Perhaps the most interesting result of this exercise is the finding that the average 
bond  issue  size  is  a  critical  variable.  The  coefficient  on  this  variable  is  positive  and 
significant at 1%, indicating that the probability of investment is strongly dependent on the 
availability of a large bond supply in the market. No matter how many firms participate in 
the  market,  and  the  frequency  of  their  issues,  as  long  as  they  participate  with  large 
placements, investors will apparently be willing to buy these bonds. This result tells us that 
investment bankers have a key role to play in designing coordination schemes to make 
bond issuance an alternative for the smaller players. 
 
Role of the Corporate Bond Market 
Up to this point we have explored what drives Colombian firms to use the market as a 
source of financing (or what limits them in their financing choices), and we have revised 
the demand-side elements that seem to play a role in determining the development of the 
corporate bond market. So far, we have obtained three main findings. First, the evidence 
suggests  that  bonds  are  not  a  cost-efficient  financing  alternative  for  the  smaller  firms. 
Second, the public debt market does not appear to be facilitating the development of the 
private side of the market in the recent years. Third, the probability to secure a demand for 
corporate bonds depends strongly on the size of the issue, leaving out of the game the firms 
with smaller financing needs.  
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But, do these findings justify government involvement in the development of the 
bond market? To answer this question further evidence has to be gathered. In particular, it 
remains to be seen if any of this matters from the point of view of economic growth and 
development. This section attempts to answer this question by analyzing the impact of the 
existence  of  a  corporate  bond  market  on  the  performance  of  the  banking  sector  in  an 
empirical setting. 
Firms that are able to obtain financing through bonds should have a better bank loan-
performance during periods of crisis. In theory, this should be the case because they are 
low-risk, having had access to financing through the market, and because they have had 
access to long-term financing, they face lower cash constraints during periods of crisis. If 
this is true, then the existence of a large corporate bond market aids the performance of the 
banking  sector  during  periods  of  crisis,  and  its  existence  is  desirable  for  purposes  of 
macroeconomic stability.  
We  use  loan  performance  data  available  at  the  ISIC  3-digit  sector  level  from 
Superintendencia  Financiera  for  the  period  1998-2004,  in  combination  with  accounting 
information from the firm-level databases already mentioned, to examine if the sectors that 
issue bonds perform better in their interaction with the banking sector during periods of 
financial stress.  
The dependent variable in the regression is the ratio at time t of sector i ‘s loans rated 
C, D, or E (i.e., low-quality loans) to sector i ‘s total loans--a measure of the sector’s loan 
performance at time t. A measure of the size of the corporate bond debt outstanding per 
sector, a banking crises dummy variable, and their interaction, are included as explanatory 
variables to capture the impact of the bond market on the bank credit market during crisis 
periods.   
 
31 
The size of corporate bond debt outstanding for each sector i at time t is measured as 
the ratio of bonds outstanding to total liabilities reported by the firms in their financial 
statements  aggregated  to  the  ISIC  3-digit  sector  level.  The  coefficient  on  this  variable 
should be negative if a lower dependence on banking credit improves the loan performance.  
The banking crises dummy variable was built to equal 1 during the years in which 
FOGAFIN, the public entity in charge of deposit insurance, made large rescue payments to 
the banking sector. By construction, the coefficient expected on this variable is positive. 
The interaction term captures whether sectors active in the bond market during crisis 
periods  have  a  better  loan  performance.  A  negative  coefficient  on  this  variable  would 
indicate that it is desirable, from a macroeconomic stability perspective, to have a large 
well-developed corporate bond market.   
The regression also includes among the explanatory variables a measure of each 
sector’s profitability constructed as the ratio of the sector’s operating profits to its total 
assets, the sector’s leverage (total liabilities to total assets) and sector level dummies to 
control for other unobserved sector-specific characteristics. The expected coefficient on the 
profitability variable is negative, since better operating performance should translate into 
better loan performance; the coefficient on leverage should be positive, because the more 
leveraged firms tend to default more on their obligations than the less leveraged.   
Contemporaneous  and  lagged  real  GDP  growth  rates  are  included  as 
macroeconomic controls. The expected signs on these variables are both negative reflecting 
the impact of recessions on loan quality. Estimation results are presented in Table 4.5. All 
coefficients in the regression have the expected signs and are significant at, at least, the 
10% level.   
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The  coefficients  on  current  and  lagged  real  GDP  growth  are  both  negative, 
confirming that economic growth also contributes to a better performance of the credit 
market.  Good  average  performance  at  the  sector  level  contributes  to  a  better  loan 
performance  (see  the  negative  coefficient  on  the  sector  average  profitability  and  the 
positive coefficient on the average leverage level). The coefficient on the sector’s average 
liabilities  share  represented  by  corporate  bonds has  a  negative  sign,  indicating  that the 
alternative of financing through the corporate bond market does contribute to a better loan 
performance. The coefficient on the banking crises dummy is indeed positive, and, most 
relevant to the question posed in this section, its interaction with the share of bond finance 
(in total corporate finance) yields a negative coefficient, suggesting that during periods of 
banking crises the existence of this alternative source of financing plays a countercyclical 
role, contributing to a better performance of banking loans. 
The findings of this section are enough to conclude that a well-functioning corporate 
debt market is key for macroeconomic stability and, thus, it is desirable to design policies 
oriented to facilitating and promoting its development. 
 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations 
Despite  having  experienced  significant  growth  over  the  last  15  years,  the  Colombian 
financial sector is still small and shallow. Both the Colombian banking and non-banking 
financial sectors are small compared to those of the developed countries and the Asian 
emerging economies. 
The development of the capital markets is recent and directly connected to a set of 
reforms introduced in the early 1990s that included the liberalization of foreign portfolio 
investment, the appearance of new institutional investors, the development of mortgage  
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securitization and significant progress towards an improved market infrastructure. Previous 
to these reforms, the dependence of firms on bank loans as a  source of financing was 
largely induced by economic policy. 
The Colombian bond market doubled in size between 1997 and 2004, largely explained 
by the dynamics of the public debt component. Corporate debt, although much smaller in 
size, also increased over time, contributing to the development of the non-bank segment of 
the financial markets.  
Using new firm-level data, the paper confirms the findings of the previous literature 
that  the  corporate  bond  market  in  Colombia  has  been  to  date  a  source  of  financing 
exclusive to the larger firms. Our empirical approach allows us to go one step further in 
answering  some  policy  implications.  We  show  that  having  the  market  as  a  source  of 
financing alternative to banking loans plays a critical stabilizing role during periods of 
banking crisis. The economy as a whole holds up better when the firms in the productive 
sectors  are  not  exclusively  dependent  on  banking  credit.  If  nothing  else,  this  evidence 
should underscore the convenience of having a well-developed corporate bond market and 
the importance of pursuing the appropriate policies to facilitate its growth.  
Regarding market participation decisions of both firms and investors, the findings of 
this paper indicate that issue size is a key driver of this market’s activity. Firm size matters 
but only to the extent that larger firms have so far been the only ones able to place large 
issues in the market. This is in line with a market preference for more liquid investments 
and for investments in which the market price is not exposed to fluctuations induced by the 
movement of individual players. 
Evidently investment banks have a key role to play as market developers if they 
understand the relevance of devising schemes to package the financing needs of the smaller  
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firms and coordinating them to reach the market with placements of the appropriate sizes. 
In doing this, investment bankers must overcome their reticence to work for the smaller 
players.  The  eye  of  the  regulatory  authorities  must  be  placed  on  facilitating  these 
coordination schemes. This may include a revision of the credit rating standards behind the 
institutional  investors’  portfolio  choices,  some  of  which  are  imposed  by  the  regulation 
regarding the portfolio management of institutional investors. For instance, the asymmetries 
in the minimum profitability requirement currently affecting the mandatory pension funds 
ought  to  be  revised,  since  the  regulation  does  not  reward  above  average  portfolio 
performances, encouraging investments only in top-rated investments. Also, it is in the 
hands of the regulatory authorities to make investment-banking services accessible in terms 
of price to the smaller players.  
We also find that the entry cost to the bond market discourages firm participation. It 
also explains why only large firms are issuers. While packaging the financing needs of the 
smaller players, as suggested in the previous paragraph, will surely aid in spreading these 
fixed costs, the government should also consider directly lowering them. In addition, any 
gain in efficiency from lowering the times required to obtain the required permissions and 
licenses from Superintendencia Financiera should be prioritized. In addition to lowering its 
own entry costs, the Stock Exchange of Colombia could help in the selection of candidate 
firms to “package” (reducing structuring costs) and spreading knowledge about the benefits 
of bond financing. 
Finally we find evidence that the competition of the public-debt component for the 
market liquidity has hurt the growth potential of the corporate bond market. The fact that 
public debt has been placed at relatively high interest rates (due to the size of the fiscal 
deficit that needs to be financed) puts a question mark on the long-term consequences of  
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fiscal policy in Colombia. While it is not the aim of this paper to determine the ways in 
which the fiscal policy of Colombia should be adjusted, much progress needs to be done in 
























Figure 4.1: Bonds by Type as Percent of GDP, 1997-2004. Source: Superintendencia 
de Sociedades, Superintendencia Financiera and Ministry of Finance of Colombia 
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Figure 4.2: Public Debt by Source (Percent of total). Source: Banco de la República de 
Colombia, Boletín de Deuda Pública, September 2005 
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Figure 4.3: Liabilities by Type, 1997-2004. Source: Superintendecia Financiera 
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Table 4.1: Bank Credit, Stock Market Capitalization and Outstanding Domestic Debt, 
2004  
 
Source: IMF (2005). Data for Colombia: Banco de la República de Colombia, 
Superintendencia Financiera.  
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Table 4.2. Issuer and Issue Characteristics, 1997-2004 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Real assets in 2004 
million dollars
max 479.036 90.067 2.750.759 515.367 494.927 3.838.823 4.297.296 4.622.397
min 100.062 90.067 97.317 2.894 44.330 33.240 124.396 1.165.800
median 113.784 90.067 283.188 167.685 280.742 215.507 420.410 1.497.680
Average corporate debt 
as share of total liabilities
12,1% 2,9% 28,0% 17,7% 17,9% 26,4% 35,2% 22,3%
Number of issuers 4 1 7 5 5 9 6 3
Number of issues 9 1 11 6 5 11 6 3
Total amount issued in 
2004 million dollars 145,24 6,43 397,13 158,10 213,77 935,53 856,44 606,76
Average issue size in 
2004 million dollars
mean 16,14 6,43 36,10 26,35 42,75 85,05 142,74 202,25
median 22,52 6,43 23,55 16,78 30,18 18,80 50,77 125,54
min 0,94 6,43 6,25 10,83 22,63 11,75 13,24 62,77
Number of issues 13 3 13 10 11 14 8 9
Total amount issued in 
2004 million dollars 182,77 7,15 582,11 255,55 405,40 1.050,71 856,31 1.258,90
Average issue size in 






Source: Superintendecia Financiera. 























Number of investors with corporate 
bonds outstanding in their portfolio
13 1 7 4 16 17 7 6 7
as share of total 28,3% 1,6% 12,7% 11% 39,0% 68,0% 100% 100% 100%
Portfolio size in 2004 million dollars
Mean 493.357 3.899 6 391.707 52 87 1.550.366 210.614 209.392
Standard deviation 539.482 3.062 7 288.946 50 100 1.089.213 119.593 189.196
Median 290.259 3.124 3 362.023 32 41 1.689.383 218.739 122.594
Portfolio share in corporate bonds
Mean 2,4% 0,0% 2,9% 2,1% 4,2% 8,3% 11,5% 10,7% 11,0%
Standard deviation 5,8% 0,2% 9,2% 1,5% 5,4% 8,3% 4,5% 6,9% 4,9%
Median 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2,0% 2,5% 7,2% 12,9% 9,3% 13,1%
Ceiling imposed by the regulation 30,0% 30% 30%
Portfolio share in treasury bonds
Mean 63,7% 63,6% 54,9% 29,0% 52,4% 64,8% 47,9% 68,2% 47,6%
Standard deviation 22,3% 28,9% 37,0% 13,7% 21,4% 20,3% 14,1% 10,0% 17,3%
Median 64,6% 74,7% 53,3% 31,7% 56,2% 67,1% 53,1% 69,9% 43,1%
Ceiling imposed by the regulation 60,0% 50%  





Table 4.4. Probit Regressions to Explain Decisions to Participate in the Bond Market  
 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 
if firm issued bonds at time t
Coefficient dF/dx
Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if 
investor has corporate bonds 




0,47 2.55e-10 0.34 0.006
(0.062)*** (0.032)***
0,44 2.40e-10 -0.29 -0.005
(0.158)*** (0.128)**





















Share of investor's portfolio in treasury 
bonds (t-1)
Average issue size





Dummy = 1 if firm issued bonds in 
(t-1)
2
Dummy = 1 if firm issued stocks 
before (t)
2
Corporate debt market entry cost
Stock market size
2. dF/x is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Financial intermediaries market 
size
Public debt market size
Relative size stock vs. financial 
intermediaries markets
1. Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%. ** denotes significance at 5%. Standard errors are robust standard errors that 
correct for the clustered nature of the yearly data. 
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Table 4.5: Impact of the Corporate Bond Market on the Banking Sector (standard 
errors in parentheses) 
 
Constant     9.84***
(2.28)
Bonds outstanding/ Total liabilities (BO)    -0.42** 
(0.13)
Financial crisis dummy (FC)     2.81** 
(0.94)
FC*BO    -0.68***
(0.13)
Profitability (Operating utility/Assets)    -0.46***
(0.08)
Leverage (Total liabilities/Total assets)     0.10*  
(0.05)
GDP growth    -0.42***
(0.09)
Lagged GDP growth    -0.67***
(0.09)
Number of observations 367
Adjusted R-squared  0,17
Dependent variable: Loan performance
Notes: (1) Standard errors are robust standard errors that correct for the clustered 
nature of the yearly data. (2) The equation includes sectoral control dummies. (3) * 




                                                 
Notes 
1. Only around 100 companies are listed. 
 
2. See Echeverry and Salazar (1999), and Caballero and Urrutia (2006). 
 
3. Dictated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, created in 1974 and formed 
by the central banks’ governors of the G-10 member countries. These goal of the standards 
is to improve the supervision guidelines that central banks or similar institutions impose on 
wholesale and retail banks.  
 
4. The pay-as-you-go regime continues to be administered by a public entity, the Instituto 
de Seguro Social (ISS). 
 
5. Before having a single stock exchange, each of the three stock exchanges had developed 
its own electronic transaction systems for fixed income operations and variable income 
operations.  These  systems  were  integrated  with  the  creation  of  the  Stock  Exchange  of 
Colombia. 
 
6. Information about the workings of the Colombian corporate bond market during the 
period 1997-2004 is not available from a single source. Firm-level data are available from 
the Superintendencia de Sociedades (SS) and at the Superintendencia Financiera (SF). The 
SS database contains the annual financial statements of 7,317 medium and large size firms,  
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obliged to report to this agency. The SF also includes accounting data, but only for the 
firms that issue equity or bonds. It contains information about the amounts issued by each 
of these firms at each point in time. Both databases were merged for the purposes of this 
research.  Finally,  detailed  accounting  statements  are  available  at  the  firm  level  for  all 
institutional investors for the period 1995-2004  from Superintendencia Financiera. This 
section and the sections that follow are based on these sources. 
 
7. In the database, 350 firms on average per year do not have a sector identifier.  
 
8. Investors’ perceptions about the corporate bond market in Colombia were captured with 
a survey. A complete summary of the answers to the full questionnaire is available in the 
Data Appendix. 
 
9. Firms’ characteristics that enter as explanatory variables are lagged to control for 
potential endogeneity. 
 
10. Time-dummies were included as explanatory variables in an alternative model firm’s 
financing  decisions.  The  coefficients  on  the  firm-level  variables  were  robust  to  the 
specification to control for elements of the macroeconomic environment that may affect the 
inclusion of these controls, but the significance of the market variables was swept away by 
it. We consider the alternative model specification -without time dummies- much more 




                                                                                                                                                   
11 . The calculated cost per peso issued does not include the costs paid to investment 
bankers and other costs that may be incurred during the issue process, so they 
underestimate the real costs. 
 
12. Standard errors are robust standard errors that correct for the clustered nature of the 
market-level variables. 
 
13. A version of the same model was estimated restricting the sample to include only the 
firms that report bonds outstanding in their balance sheets in each period. We found that the 
variables driving the decision of a firm to issue bonds are robust to whether the firm is a 
new  or  an  experienced  bond-issuer.  The  results  of  this  exercise  are  available  from  the 
authors. 
 
14. A measure of firm performance--the firm’s return on equity (ROE)--was included in 
alternative  model  specifications  and  discarded  due  to  lack  of  significance.  Results  are 
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